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Abstract 
As the success of social media platforms heavily depends on the amount and the 
nature of user-generated content, content monetization has been introduced as 
a mechanism to incentivize users to generate content. In particular, content 
contributors can be paid (i.e. tipped) by readers who like the story. We adopted 
difference-in-differences approach with robustness matching estimator to 
examine the impact of content monetization. Our results confirm that the content 
monetization effectively motivate content demand and supply and also improves 
content quality. Furthermore, such economic incentives have a spillover effect 
on ordinary weibo users before they are eligible to adopt “tipping” function. 
However, the verified users who have already been the experts or celebrities in the 
society may be depressed after open application of the program. This result 
suggests that start-ups are able to survive and earn profit even in markets that 
are dominated by famous celebrities because of the monetization mechanism. 
Keywords:  Content monetization, content supply, content quality, content demand, user-
generated content, economic incentives 
Introduction 
With the maturity of social media, online review systems, and collaborative forum, user-generated-
content (UGC) has reached such high levels of quantity and variety that it is comparable to that produced 
by professional agencies. The greatest value of UGC website from the perspective of users is that these 
platforms provide huge amount of user-generated content (UGC) that becomes crowdsourced 
knowledge shared through the networks (Albors et al. 2008). However, UGC platforms hold potential 
low engagement risks because of two main reasons. On the one hand, consumers are expecting their 
social media consumption to be free; on the other hand, casual internet users often lack domain expertise 
and they may lack incentives to contribute in a crowd environment (Lukyanenko et al. 2014). As a result, 
content providers are under increasing pressure to monetize their content.  
Major social media platforms are seeking innovative content monetization strategies to get users to 
spend money on existing content, in addition to traditional advertisement-sponsored revenue model. An 
increasingly popular option of content monetization is the donation button (also referred as “tip” button 
in Sina Weibo or “buy me a coffee” button supported by PayPal), which allows content consumers to 
donate any amount of money to the original content creators. This process generates local positive 
feedback between content generation and content consumption, which thereby produces a self-
reinforcing “virtuous cycle” and actives the whole platform.  
                                                     
1 Xi Chen, School of Management, Zhejiang University, Alibaba-Zhejiang University Joint Institute of Frontier Technologies. 
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The introduction of content monetization mechanism is the latest prevalent practice to incentivize 
content generation and consumption in UGC market. The extant research on content generation 
primarily focus on the research questions of how online users are incentivized to generate UGC when 
lacking direct monetary incentives (Chen et al. 2010, Trusov et al. 2010). These factors include user 
characteristics (Bateman et al. 2011), characteristics of the social network (Zhang and Zhu 2011), and 
information system design features (Moon and Sproull 2008). In addition, the impact of UGC on content 
consumers’ activities are investigated independently in another UGC literature branch (Mishne and 
Glance 2006; Goh et al. 2013). Researchers have attempted to identify the impact of UGC on product 
sales (Jabr and Zheng 2013), stock performance (Tirunillai and Tellis 2012), and even the success of 
social media site (Susarla et al. 2012) in online communities. As it is demonstrated above, existing 
studies tend to focus on one perspective, either from the demand side (Singh et al. 2014; Susarla et al. 
2012) or supply side (Goes et al. 2014; Zeng and Wei 2013). Therefore, it becomes imperative for both 
scholars and practitioners to understand the factors that motivate the supply of high quality UGC. 
In this study, we propose the introduction of the online donation feature as an effective tool in social 
media platform to motivate content suppliers to generate high-quality content, which subsequently 
attracts more content consumers and ultimately increases user loyalty. The introduction of content 
monetization is regarded as a natural experiment-like change therefore allows for similar identification 
approaches in field experiment to examine the impact of such exogenous shock. We employ the 
difference-in-differences (DID) model (Atanasov and Black 2014) combined with matching estimators 
(Abadie and Imbens 2006) to investigate the impact of content monetization adoption in social media 
on the supply and demand of UGC as well as the content quality. Our empirical results show that content 
monetization mechanism effectively motivate the demand and supply for UGC and also improves 
content quality. Furthermore, such economic incentives have a spillover effect on ordinary weibo users 
before they are eligible to adopt “tipping” function. However, the verified users who have already been 
the experts, celebrities or other public figures in the society may be depressed after open application of 
the program. This result suggests that small, less popular content creators are able to survive and earn 
profit even in markets that are dominated by larger firms because of the monetization mechanism.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the relevant literature 
and discuss how our work extend the existing research. In section 3, we describes the empirical context 
for our data. In section 4, we adopt a difference-in-differences model that captures the impact of content 
monetization mechanism. Section 5 makes a further discussion on the empirical results. Section 6 draws 
conclusions. 
Literature Review 
Our paper is closely related to the large body of literature on UGC. UGC takes a variety of formats 
including product reviews, descriptions of product usage, “homemade advertising”, blogs, and other 
consumer-initiated contributions (Fader and Winer 2012). Existing papers have studied a wide range of 
topics related to content consumption (e.g. how UGC affects individual consumer behavior) and content 
generation (e.g. why and how people contribute content). 
Content Consumption. Many prior studies have examined how various aspects of UGC such as volume, 
valence, or variance affect user behaviors (Goes et al. 2014). In the information systems literature, UGC 
has been found to affect business decision making in many contexts, including business applications 
(Gangi et al. 2010), e-commerce (Zwass 2010), new product development (Mallapragada et al. 2012), 
adoption of navigation and mapping systems (Haklay 2010), emergency management (Majchrzak and 
More 2011), scientific research (Hand 2010), healthcare (Gao et al. 2010), and politics (Wattal et al. 
2010). In marketing literature, there is ample empirical evidence suggesting the effectiveness of UGC 
in affecting consumer buying and consumption behavior. For example, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) 
found that consumer ratings positively affect book sales. A few other studies found that buyers seem to 
find movies and books that have generated numerous reviews more interesting, which in turn drive 
greater demand, than those movies and books that have not received as many reviews (Dellarocas et al. 
2004, Liu 2006).  
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Content Generation. The literature on content generation has focused primarily on users’ motivations 
to participate. As it is studied in many online contexts, such as open source software (Lerner and Tirole 
2002), online forums (Jeppesen and Frederiksen 2006), and blogs (Faw 2012), peer recognition and 
online reputation are identified as two most important motivations for users’ voluntary contributions to 
UGC. Moe and Schweidel (2012) found two separate effects that may influence individual’s decision 
on whether to submit a product rating on an e-commerce platform. Customers may prefer to be 
consistent with previously posted ratings by the majority (i.e. selection effect), or otherwise to stand out 
from the crowd by revising their evaluations upward or downward based on previously posted ratings 
of others (i.e. adjustment effect). Scott, Nair and Hofstetter (2013) documented that social ties can also 
facilitate content generation on a social networking site by controlling group formation endogeneity and 
other confounding factors. The associations between social ties and content generation are linked to 
several motivations, including altruistic user intention to sharing information with others and a desire 
to increase social status within a peer group (referred as audience effect). Shen, Hu and Rees (2015) 
empirically examined how online reviewers’ behaviors are driven by the desire to gain attention and 
online reputation. 
Our analysis of user generated content differs from the previous research in two ways. First, we study 
how content monetization mechanism affects user content generation behavior as well as content 
consumption behavior, an important but under-researched topic. Second, we adopt a difference-in 
differences approach to examine the spillover effect of content monetization across different types of 
users (verified users versus non-verified users). 
Data and Context 
We collected our data from one of the largest leading social media platforms in the world, Sina Weibo. 
Weibo allows users to create and post a feed and attach content. Any user can follow any other users 
and add comments to a feed while reposting. Like other microblogging services such as Twitter, Weibo 
is still managing to get people to be actively contributing content rather than watching passively. On 
August 1st, 2014, the company started offering the online donation feature by attaching a “tipping” 
button to long articles (i.e., blogs exceeding the 140-characters limit) posted on Weibo. From August 
2014 to January 2015, the platform conducted a test-run of the “tipping” function and only verified-
users are invited to participate in this content monetization practice. Since the test-run ended on January 
2015, Sina have accepted applications for the online donation feature from all users. We randomly 
sampled 10,151 users from the Weibo platform, encompassing 1,127 users who had ever posted at least 
one articles before the launch of a tipping button, 835 users who posted their first article during the test 
period, 1,330 users who posted their first articles during the open application period, and 6,859 users 
who never posted any articles during our sample period between January 2014 and September 2015. 
The segments of our sampled users based on adoption time of article posting are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Segments of users based on adoption time of article posting 
Our work leverages three types of data, namely, user demographic profile, user content generation data, 
and content profile information (including article-related and microblog-related features). User 
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ADOPTION OF ARTICLE POSTING
verified users common users
 An Empirical Analysis of Content Monetization 
  
 Twenty-Second Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Japan 2018  
demographic profile includes gender, registration time, level, verification type (verified celebrities or 
not), number of friends, number of followers, number of posts (also called microblogs), which serve as 
control variables in our model. User content generation data captures users’ article posting behaviors 
from January 2014 to September 2015 together with their microblog posting behaviors from May 2014 
to May 2015. The count of articles and microblogs created by users are used as outcome variables of 
interest to examine the supply of UGC. Article-related profile information contains number of 
characters, number of pictures, the number of reading, favorite, and tipping obtained by each article, 
which are also used as outcome variables to measure the article quality and article demand. Microblog-
related profile information contains number of microblogs, average number of reposts, comments, 
favorites obtained by microblogs, which are used as outcome variables to measure microblog supply 
and microblog demand. Microblogs is regarded as the complementary product for long articles, whose 
supply is also assumed to be affected by “tipping” incentives.  
Based on the article posting data, we focus our analysis on the 3,292 active article authors who have 
posted at least one article during the observation time, so that it is meaningful to estimate the impact of 
“tipping” function on the shifts in supply, demand, and quality of articles. In addition to the policy 
changes at different time periods, we are also interested in the different reactions of verified users and 
non-verified users to the policy changes. Because during the test period from August 2014 to January 
2015, tipping function is only eligible for verified users who posted long articles. However, this policy 
changed that all long articles posted after January 2015 would automatically have the tipping button, 
which means that verified users no longer have the privilege to monetize the content. The motivations 
of verified and non-verified users to post long articles may be affected by those policy changes. Thus, 
we use verified type of users as one treatment variable and also control the breakpoints of the policy 
changes as well as the “tipping” enrollment date of each user. Figure 2 demonstrates the trend of article 
posting across the observed 21 months. Figure 3 shows the number of active users who posted at least 
one articles in each month. During the test period, only 543 verified users who posted long articles with 
tipping function. After the announcement of open application, 1586 common users and 972 verified 
users participate in posting articles with “tipping” button. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics 
of the variables used for article posting analysis. 
 
Figure 2.  Number of articles created in each month from Jan 2014 to Sep 2015 
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Figure 3.  Active authors of long articles in each month during Jan 2014 to 
Sep 2015 
Table 1. Summary statistics of outcome, treatment, and control variables 
 (article posting data) 
Article Posting Data     Users:3292 Time:21 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome Variables 
Num_articles 0.926 5.331 0 284 
Num_chars 259.998 962.469 0 32759 
Num_pics 0.818 5.052  519 
Num_reading 1411.287 3266.14 0 4000000 
Num_favorite 15.776 764.448 0 180356 
Num_tipping 0.95 9.21 0 398 
Treatment Variables  
Verifiedtype 0.337 0.473 0 1 
AfterEnroll(it) 0.319 0.466 0 1 
AfterAug(t) 0.658 0.474 0 1 
AfterJan(t) 0.404 0.491 0 1 
Control Variables 
Friend_count 590.018 653.812 0 4984 
Follow_count 70758.5 456332.2  1.16E+07 
Statues_count 5444.361 9167.753 0 113536 
Gender 0.542 0.489 0 1 
Level 14.867 8.063 0 36 
Isvip 0.334 0.472 0 1 
Regist_time 1762.48 1665.568 242 42277 
Based on the microblogging posting data, we focus our analysis on all the users in our sample including 
both adopters and non-adopters of tipping button. We aim to examine whether the adoption of the 
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tipping button feature may exert significant influence on users’ microblog posting behavior as well. 
Therefore, “tipping” function adopters and non-adopters are regarded as treatment and control groups 
respectively. The change of microblog posting behaviors before and after enrollment dates as well as 
two breakpoints of policy changes (August 2014 and January 2015) are compared between the adopters 
and non-adopters. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used for microblog 
posting analysis. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of outcome, treatment variables, and control variables 
(microblog posting data) 
Microblog Posting Data     Users:6311 Time:12 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Outcome Variables 
Num_microblogs 10.403 52.037 0 4158 
Num_comments 243.67 18259 0 3694005 
Num_reposts 972.87 163578.4 0 4.43E+07 
Num_favorite_micro 678.104 46892.58 0 5429643 
Treatment Variables 
Adoption 0.367 0.482 0 1 
AfterEnroll(it) 0.128 0.334 0 1 
AfterAug(t) 0.248 0.432 0 1 
AfterJan(t) 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Control Variables 
Friend_count 446.734 544.026 0 4995 
Follow_count 50761.07 492562.3 0 1.20E+07 
Statues_count 3414.244 6950.351 0 132300 
Gender 0.472 0.499 0 1 
Level 12.632 7.334 0 37 
Isvip 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Verifiedtype 0.218 0.413 0 1 
Regist_time(day) 1671.277 1433.64 242 42277 
Model and Results 
We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) model (Atanasov and Black 2014) to evaluate the impact 
of the online donation feature on the shifts in content supply, content quality, and content demand. Our 
main estimation equation for user i in month t is 
0 1 2 3 3+ +it i it i it it t itOutcome Treatment After Treatment After X                                  (1) 
where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the log-transformed measure of content supply (number of articles or microblogs 
created by user i in month t), content quality (the average number of characters, the average number of 
pictures in articles), or content demand (the average number of readings obtained by articles). 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖  is the indicator for users in treatment group. Specifically, in article posting behavior 
analysis it is denoted as 1 if user i is verified as celebrities by Weibo, and 0 otherwise (i.e. variable 
“Verified”), while in microblog posting behavior analysis it is denoted as 1 if user i participates in the 
monetization program, and 0 otherwise (i.e. variable “Adopt”). Another binary variable 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is 1 if 
user i has already adopted the tipping function in month t, and 0 otherwise (i.e. variable “AfterEnroll”). 
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Considering the policy change between the test period and open application, we redefine 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 to 
indicate whether month t is before or after August 2014 and January 2015 (i.e. variable “AfterAug” and 
“AfterJan”). The coefficient 𝛽3 for the interaction term, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, is our difference-in-
differences estimator that captures how outcome variables change in the treatment group after 
monetization program enrollment (or after monetization policy changes) in contrast to that of control 
group in the same period. The individual-specific attributes, such as, number of friends, number of 
followers, number of statues, gender, level, and registration time are used as control variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡. 
Time fixed effect 𝜏𝑡 is added to control for changes in all bloggers’ propensity to produce content across 
the 21 month. Tables 3 – 7 illustrate the estimation results.  
Table 3. Estimation results for shift in article supply (num_article) 
Enrollment as Breakpoints August 2014 as Breakpoints January 2015 as Breakpoints 
 Coef.   Coef.  Coef. 
Verified 
-0.239** 
(0.055) 
Verified -0.413**  
(0.077) 
Verified -0.007  
(0.060) 
AfterEnroll 
0.679** 
(0.063)  
AfterAug 0.506*  
(0.051) 
AfterJan 0.667** 
(0.146) 
Verified*After
Enroll 
2.963** 
(0.087) 
Verified*After
Aug 
1.803** 
(0.089) 
Verified*After 
Jan 
1.855** 
(0.084) 
Friend_count 
3.32E-05 
(3.44E-05) 
Friend_count 
2.97E-05 
(3.49E-05) 
Friend_count 6.38E-05 
(3.48E-05) 
Follow_count 
-7.28E-08* 
(4.41E-08) 
Follow_count 
-1.06E-07** 
(4.47E-08) 
Follow_count -7.83E-08 
(4.46E-08) 
Statues_count 
2.5E-05** 
(2.41E-06) 
Statues_count 
2.75E-05** 
(2.44E-06) 
Statues_count 2.91E-05** 
(2.43E-06) 
Gender 
0.396** 
(0.041) 
Gender 
0.386** 
(0.041) 
Gender 0.428** 
(0.041) 
Level 
0.047** 
(0.003) 
Level 
0.053** 
(0.003) 
Level 0.052** 
(0.003) 
Isvip 
0.287** 
(0.047) 
Isvip 
0.303** 
(0.048) 
Isvip 0.328** 
(0.048) 
Regist_time 
-3.19E-05** 
(1.18E-05) 
Regist_time 
-2.5E-05** 
(1.19E-05) 
Regist_time -2.37E-05* 
(1.19E-05) 
 
Table 4a. Estimation results for shift in article quality (num_chars) 
Enrollment as Breakpoints August 2014 as Breakpoints January 2015 as Breakpoints 
 Coef.   Coef.  Coef. 
Verified 
-0.067** 
(0.011) 
Verified 
-0.129** 
(0.015) 
Verified 
-0.017** 
(0.012) 
AfterEnroll 
0.278** 
(0.013) 
AfterAug 
0.224* 
(0.097) 
AfterJan 
0.223** 
(0.088) 
Verified*After
Enroll 
0.760** 
(0.017) 
Verified*After
Aug 
0.492** 
(0.018) 
Verified*After 
Jan 
0.504** 
(0.017) 
 An Empirical Analysis of Content Monetization 
  
 Twenty-Second Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Japan 2018  
Friend_count 
4.4E-05** 
(6.8E-06) 
Friend_count 
5.31E-05** 
(7.04E-06) 
Friend_count 
5.31E-05** 
(7.03E-06) 
Follow_count 
2.11E-09 
(8.81E-09) 
Follow_count 
2.98E-10 
(9.03E-09) 
Follow_count 
2.98E-10 
(9.02E-09) 
Statues_count 
2.66E-06** 
(4.81E-07) 
Statues_count 
3.97E-06** 
(4.92E-07) 
Statues_count 
3.97E-06** 
(4.91E-07) 
Gender 
0.070** 
(0.081) 
Gender 
0.080** 
(0.008) 
Gender 
0.080** 
(0.008) 
Level 
0.016** 
(5.64E-04) 
Level 
0.018** 
(5.77E-04) 
Level 
0.018** 
(5.77E-04) 
Isvip 
0.078** 
(0.009) 
Isvip 
0.090** 
(0.010) 
Isvip 
0.090** 
(0.010) 
Regist_time 
-7.83E-07 
(0.038) 
Regist_time 
3.28E-06 
(2.41E-06) 
Regist_time 3.28E-06  
(2.41E-06) 
 
Table 4b. Estimation results for shift in article quality (num_pics) 
Enrollment as Breakpoints August 2014 as Breakpoints January 2015 as Breakpoints 
 Coef.   Coef.  Coef. 
Verified 0.065  
(0.053) 
Verified 
-0.123 
(0.073) 
Verified 
0.030 
(0.057) 
AfterEnroll 
0.230** 
(0.061) 
AfterAug 
0.629** 
(0.240) 
AfterJan 0.716**  
(0.144) 
Verified*After
Enroll 
1.983** 
(0.084) 
Verified*After
Aug 
1.303** 
(0.085) 
Verified*After 
Jan 
1.670** 
(0.081) 
Friend_count 
1.33E-04** 
(3.32E-05) 
Friend_count 
1.51E-04** 
(3.33E-05) 
Friend_count 
1.51E-04** 
(3.33E-05) 
Follow_count 
7.07E-08* 
(4.25E-08) 
Follow_count 
6.78E-08 
(4.27E-08) 
Follow_count 
6.78E-08 
(4.27E-08) 
Statues_count 
-3.88E-06* 
(2.32E-06) 
Statues_count 
-1.69E-06 
(2.33E-06) 
Statues_count 
-1.69E-06 
(2.32E-06) 
Gender 
-2.52** 
(0.039) 
Gender 
-0.235** 
(0.039) 
Gender 
-0.235** 
(0.039) 
Level 
1.26E-05 
(0.003) 
Level 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Level 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Isvip 
0.522** 
(0.046) 
Isvip 
0.547** 
(0.046) 
Isvip 
0.547** 
(0.046) 
Regist_time 
7.48E-05** 
(1.14E-05) 
Regist_time 
7.95E-05** 
(1.14E-05) 
Regist_time 
7.95E-05** 
(1.14E-05) 
 
Table 5. Estimation results for shift in article demand (num_reading) 
Enrollment as Breakpoints August 2014 as Breakpoints January 2015 as Breakpoints 
 An Empirical Analysis of Content Monetization 
  
 Twenty-Second Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Japan 2018  
 Coef.   Coef.  Coef. 
Verified 
-0.084** 
(0.009) 
Verified 
-0.158** 
(0.012) 
Verified 
-0.044** 
(0.010) 
AfterEnroll 
0.184** 
(0.010) 
AfterAug 
0.351** 
(0.048) 
AfterJan 
0.261** 
(0.059) 
Verified*After
Enroll 
0.836** 
(0.014) 
Verified*After
Aug 
0.546** 
(0.014) 
Verified*After 
Jan 
0.583** 
(0.014) 
Friend_count 
6.23E-07 
(5.50E-06) 
Friend_count 
9.15E-06 
(5.69E-06) 
Friend_count 
9.15E-06 
(5.67E-06) 
Follow_count 
9.89E-08** 
(7.06E-09) 
Follow_count 
9.74E-08** 
(7.29E-09) 
Follow_count 
9.74E-08** 
(7.27E-09) 
Statues_count 
2.10E-06** 
(3.85E-07) 
Statues_count 
3.24E-06** 
(3.97E-07) 
Statues_count 
3.24E-06** 
(3.96E-07) 
Gender 
0.031** 
(0.007) 
Gender 
0.040** 
(0.007) 
Gender 
0.040** 
(0.007) 
Level 
0.019** 
(4.52E-04) 
Level 
0.021** 
(4.66E-04) 
Level 
0.021** 
(4.65E-04) 
Isvip 
0.154** 
(0.008) 
Isvip 
0.166** 
(0.008) 
Isvip 
0.166** 
(0.008) 
Regist_time 
6.52E-07 
(1.88E-06) 
Regist_time 
2.94E-06 
(1.95E-06) 
Regist_time 
2.94E-06 
(1.94E-06) 
 
Table 6. Estimation results for shift in microblog supply (num_microblogs) 
Enrollment as Breakpoints August 2014 as Breakpoints January 2015 as Breakpoints 
 Coef.   Coef.  Coef. 
Adopt 
2.986** 
(0.470) 
Adopt 
2.230** 
 (0.6210) 
Adopt 
3.037** 
(0.528) 
Adopt*After 
Enroll 
6.639** 
(0.679) 
Adopt*After 
Aug 
5.925** 
(1.041) 
Adopt*After 
Jan 
5.110** 
(0.787) 
Friend_count 
0.003** 
(3.97E-04) 
Friend_count 
0.003** 
(3.98E-04) 
Friend_count 
0.003** 
(3.97E-04) 
Follow_count 
5.87E-07 
(3.90E-07) 
Follow_count 
5.48E-07 
(3.90E-07) 
Follow_count 
5.53E-07 
(3.90E-07) 
Statues_count 
4.18E-04** 
(3.17E-05) 
Statues_count 
4.26E-04** 
(3.18E-05) 
Statues_count 
4.20E-04** 
(3.18E-05) 
Gender 
4.307** 
(0.0383) 
Gender 
-4.388** 
(0.383) 
Gender 
4.383** 
(0.383) 
Level 
-0.469** 
(0.032) 
Level 
-0.452** 
(0.032) 
Level 
-0.451** 
(0.032) 
Isvip 
-1.231*  
(0.526) 
Isvip 
-1.126*  
(0.526) 
Isvip 
-1.151*  
(0.526) 
Regist_time 
9.39E-05 
(1.32E-04) 
Regist_time 
-7.95E-05 
(1.32E-04) 
Regist_time 
-8.76E-05 
(1.32E-04) 
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Table 7. Estimation results for shift in microblog demand (num_favorite_micro) 
Enrollment as Breakpoints August2014 as Breakpoints January2015 as Breakpoints 
 Coef.   Coef.  Coef. 
Adopt 
0.017* 
 (0.006) 
Adopt 
0.068** 
(0.012) 
Adopt 
0.021** 
(0.006) 
Adopt*AfterEn
roll 
0.190** 
(0.008) 
Adopt*AfterA
ug 
0.176** 
(0.013) 
Adopt*AfterJa
n 
 0.139** 
(0.010) 
Friend_count 
2.11E-05  
(4.79E-06) 
Friend_count 
2.3E-05  
(4.80E-06) 
Friend_count 
2.3E-005**  
(4.84E-06)  
Follow_count 
9.45E-08** 
(4.70E-09) 
Follow_count 
9.40E-08** 
(4.71E-09) 
Follow_count 
9.40E-08** 
(4.71E-09) 
Statues_count 
-8.49E-06** 
(3.83E-07) 
Statues_count 
-8.16E-06** 
(3.84E-07) 
Statues_count 
-8.16E-06** 
(3.84E-07) 
Gender 
0.028** 
(0.005) 
Gender 
0.030** 
(0.005) 
Gender 
0.030** 
(0.005) 
Level 
0.003** 
(3.81E-04) 
Level 
0.030** 
(3.82E-04) 
Level 
0.003** 
(3.82E-04) 
Isvip 
0.033** 
(0.006) 
Isvip 
0.036** 
(0.006) 
Isvip 
0.036** 
(0.006) 
Regist_time 
3.83E-06* 
(1.59E-06) 
Regist_time 
4.30E-06** 
(1.59E-06) 
Regist_time 
4.30E-06** 
(1.59E-06) 
 
When we use each users’ enrollment dates as breakpoints, our model reports significant positive 
difference-in-differences estimators for shifts in article supply (Table 3), article quality (Table 4a and 
4b), article demand (Table 5), and microblog supply (Table 6), but the effect of monetization adoption 
has insignificant effect on microblog demand (Table 7). It indicates that the adoption of “tipping” 
function will significantly increase the verified users’ motivation to write more articles with higher 
quality, and even more microblogs. At the meantime, the verified users will attract more article readers 
after adopting the tipping function. However, the demand of microblog is not significantly changed 
after participation in content monetization program. When we use August 2014, the starting of test 
period, as breakpoints, we also observed significant positive difference-in-differences estimators for 
shifts in article supply (Table 3), article quality (Table 4a and 4b), and article demand (Table 5), and 
microblog supply (Table 6), but insignificant estimator for shifts in microblog demand (Table 7). The 
estimation results when using January 2015 as breakpoints are consistent with that of August 2014 in 
direction but a bit larger in magnitude. We found that the difference in shifts of article supply, article 
quality, and article demand after policy changes between verified users and non-verified users (i.e. the 
coefficients of Verified*AfterAug and Verified*AfterJan) are both smaller than that after the enrollment 
dates (i.e. the coefficients of Verified*AfterEnroll). The shifts after open application are larger than that 
after the starting of the test period. It indicates that the announcement of content monetization program 
encourages non-verified users to make greater effort in article supply and quality control than the actual 
adoption effect of tipping function, even though “tipping” is only allowed for verified users during the 
test period. The greater efforts of non-verified users also win more article demand shifts after the policy 
changes than that after enrollment. This phenomenon is recognized as the spillover effect of content 
monetization policy. In terms of the microblog supply and demand, tipping button adopters have larger 
shifts in writing and consuming microblogs after enrollment and after policy changes compared with 
non-adopters. The shifts after open application become smaller than that during the test period. 
In order to address the robustness of our empirical results based on DID model, we further conduct 
nearest neighbor matching estimators (Abadie and Imbens 2006) to compare the shifts of content 
amount and content quality generated by users from treatment groups with that from control group. 
Because we are unable to empirically propose an absolute exogenous instrument variables, we address 
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the potential selection bias by matching adopters with non-adopters based on observables using a 
propensity score matching method. We use the pre-event and post-event observation for each user. We 
fist collapse each of our outcome variables 𝑌𝑖𝑡, where Y ϵ {num_articles, num_characters, num_pictures, 
num_readings, num_microblogs}, into two month averages before and after two breakpoints: August 
2014 and January 2015. We then generate new variables ∆𝑌𝐼 by taking the difference between the pre-
event and post-event averages. We matched users based on individual attributes, such as gender, level, 
regist_time, etc., to control for any additional unobserved heterogeneity in content creation behavior. 
We use the matching algorithm by Abadie and Imbens (2006), which computes a distance score between 
a treated unit and all possible untreated neighbors based on the matching parameters, and then matches 
each treated unit with the closest three untreated units, with replacement. The exact procedure is 
implemented in the NNMATCH module for STATA. Table 8 shows the DID matching estimators 
across different treatment and control groups. 
Table 8. DID matching estimator 
outcome ∆num_article ∆num_chars ∆num_pics ∆num_reading ∆num_micro 
Break points 
Aug 
2014 
Jan 2015 
Aug 
2014 
Jan 2015 
Aug 
2014 
Jan 2015 
Aug 
2014 
Jan 2015 
Aug 
2014 
Jan 
2015 
Adopter vs 
Nonadopter 
1.71** 
(0.19) 
1.29** 
(0.20) 
271** 
(51.97) 
159** 
(21.34) 
1.18** 
(0.14) 
1.01** 
(0.19) 
367** 
(91.05) 
1892** 
(376) 
3.20 
(3.23) 
5.52** 
(2.47) 
Verified 
Adopter vs  
Nonadopter 
2.86** 
(0.42) 
2.08** 
(0.58) 
293** 
(97.77) 
248** 
(38.89) 
1.98** 
(0.27) 
1.20** 
(0.24) 
754** 
(211) 
4026** 
(973) 
15.7** 
(5.47) 
7.17 
(6.10) 
Common 
Adopter vs 
Nonadopter 
- 
0.84** 
(0.13) 
- 
93.9** 
(25.52) 
- 
0.41 
(0.31) 
- 
532* 
(224) 
-5.74 
(4.16) 
3.78** 
(1.01) 
Verified vs 
Common 
Adopter 
- 
1.66** 
(0.55) 
- 
148** 
(68.78) 
- 
1.36** 
(0.40) 
- 
2269 
(1256) 
35.0** 
(8.861) 
4.25 
(12.42) 
Verified vs 
Common 
Nonadopter 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0 
4.055 
(39.76) 
0 
-0.029 
(0.034) 
0 
-39.84 
(33.44) 
0 
6.77** 
(3.19) 
7.71 
(6.35) 
 
The adoption of content monetization in the test period is linked to 1.71 more articles supply, 271 more 
characters in average length, and 1.18 more pictures, while the amount changes reduce to 1.29, 159, 
and 1.01 respectively across open application period. As to the difference between verified adopters 
and non-adopters, we also observe larger increase in article supply (2.86 more articles) and article 
quality (293 more characters in average length and 1.98 more pictures) across August 2014 than the 
shifts across January 2015 (2.08 more articles, 248 more characters in average length, and 1.20 more 
pictures). It indicates that adopters after January 2015 are less motivated in article posting comparing 
with those verified adopters during test period. 
From the article demand side, January 2015 witness a much larger increase in average number of 
readings than that happened in August 2015. But the changes of average reading number before and 
after January 2015 received by verified adopters and by common adopters do not have significant 
difference, which indicates that the platform construct a very healthy environment for common users to 
make fair competition with celebrities.   
In terms of the change of microblog supply, the matching estimators indicate interesting result that the 
significant difference between verified and common adopters or non-adopters across the test period 
becomes insignificant during the open application period. In addition, the changes of microblog supply 
by verified adopters across test period is significantly 1.57 higher than that by verified non-adopters, 
but this figure also becomes insignificant across open application period. On the contrary, the 
insignificant difference between common adopters and common non-adopters across test period 
becomes significant (3.78 with p-value 0.00) across open application period. It implies that the policy 
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change in January 2015 (allowing all users to apply for “tipping” function) demotivate the verified users’ 
supply of microblogs but trigger common users to post more microblogs. 
Discussion 
According to the empirical results, content monetization mechanism exhibit a very deterministic role to 
increase both content supply and content demand in social media platform. Our study has three notable 
findings. First, the announcement of content monetization program as well as the actual adoption of 
tipping function significantly motivates weibo users, especially verified users, to participate in high 
quality content generation. At the initial stage, verified users make less effort in content supply and 
quality control compared with non-verified users (i.e. significantly negative coefficients of “Verified”). 
After the introduction of content monetization mechanism, we observe significantly larger increase in 
content supply and content quality on verified users than that on non-verified users. It indicates that the 
content monetization mechanism successfully encourages verified users to contribute more high-quality 
content. Along with the growth of content supply and content quality, the demand of high-quality 
content also increases significantly due to the introduction of content monetization mechanism. 
Second, we found the impact of content monetization program may take effect before weibo users’ 
actual adoption behavior. To be specific, many weibo users may start generating high-quality articles 
in preparation for enrolling in content monetization program right after the program’s announcement, 
even though no monetary incentives can be obtained by non-verified users during the testing period. 
Thus, we observe smaller differences in shift of content supply and content quality between verified 
users and non-verified users after policy announcement than that after “tipping” enrollment. 
Furthermore, the constrained application of content monetization during testing period may generate 
spillover effects on ordinary weibo users’ content supply efforts, so the differences in shift of content 
supply and content quality between verified users and non-verified users after the starting of test period  
(August 2014) is even smaller than that after open application (January 2015).  On the other hand, such 
policy changes from restricted authorization to open application may depress verified users to some 
extent. The propensity score matching estimators show that adopters after January 2015 are less 
motivated in article posting comparing with those verified adopters during test period.  
Third, in addition to article supply and demand, content monetization mechanism also positively affect 
the supply and demand of microblogs, which is regarded as a complementary product of articles in 
social media. The adopters of tipping function will also make additional effort on microblog posting, 
and in return attract more attention from other users in social media. We further explore the variation 
across verified adopters, verified non-adopters, non-verified adopters, and non-verified non-adopters, 
and found that the policy change in January 2015 (allowing all users to apply for “tipping” function) 
demotivate the verified users’ supply of microblogs but trigger common users to post more microblogs. 
Therefore, content monetization mechanism not only brings economic incentives to professional 
content generation, but also drives the growth of casual content generation in social media.   
Conclusion 
 In this paper, we devoted to understanding the impact of content monetization program on the supply 
and demand of both professional and casual content in social media. Results indicate that content 
monetization mechanism successfully motivates high-quality content contribution in social media, thus 
attract increasing content consumption. Furthermore, the economic incentives caused by content 
monetization mechanism even have a stronger effect on ordinary weibo users than on the verified users 
who have already been the experts, celebrities or other public figures in the society. The monetization 
mechanism builds up a healthy competition market in which start-up content creators are able to survive 
and earn profit even in markets that are dominated by famous celebrities. Overall, the content 
monetization mechanism in social media actives the whole market from both demand and supply sides. 
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